Gaetano Salvemini - La politica estera italiana dal 1871 al 1915

The ltalo-Turkish War the agreement of 1909. The German Government did not seem hostile. The only resistance to be expected would come from Austria, and of course, from the Turks. But would they challenge the Triple Entente without the support of Germany? All these calculation were erroneous. When the Russian ambassador to Constantinople made his proposals, fìrst semi-officiallyand later officially, the Cabinets of Paris and London gave only vague promises of consent, contin– gent upon the acquiescence of the Ottoman Government. The Italians, entan– gled in Libya, could not help. The German and Austro-Hungarian ambassa– dors to Constantinople urged the Turks to resist. In consequence, Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, allowed the matter to• drop (December 6th). Obliged thus to retreat, Sazonoff tried to make the Turks pay for their resistance. On Dee. 15th he put forward a proposal that the four great Powers which were neutral in the Italo-Turkish War, should bring about an ar– mistice between the two belligerents. The armistice was to be followed by a peace imposed upon the Turks on the conditions desired by the Italians. This step also proved a mistaken one. The other Cabinet fell back on one of those interminable "exchanges of views 11 with which diplomats mark time when they do not mean to say either yes or no. Meanwhile, negotiations proceeded for the renewel of the Triple Allian– ce. Germans, Austrians and Italians agreed that none of the provisoes of the treaty proter needed changing. But when once Italian sovereignty over Li– bya had been rècognized - and on this point Giolitti and San Giuliano were adamant - the agreement of 1902, appended to the treaty of the Triple Alliance, would have lost all meaning. It must be superseded by a now agree– ment guaranteeing to Italy the possession of her new colony. In the thick of the discussions over the formula of the new agreement, an important event strengthened the currents in Italy favorable to the Triple Alliance. The Austrian Chief of Generai Staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf, an implacable foe to Italy, not content with Aehrenthal's veto on Italian military enterprises both in Albania and in the Aegean Sea, sought to use the Libyan war to force Italy, by threat of war if necessary, into garanting a free hand to Austria in the Balkans. Neither Aehrenthal nor the Emperor Francis Joseph was willing to countenance such an aggressive policy and Conrad had to reisgn. As the Italian ambassador to Vienna gleefully remarked: "he was sacrifìced on the altar of the Triple Alliance. 11 This event strengthened the pro-German and pro-Austrian currents in Italy. But the problem of Libya still remained unsolved. Therefore on December 15th, San Giuliano realized that it was not expe– dient to sign the new treaty of alliance at that moment. It would be wiser to wait until the war was over. It was a discret way of intimating that the sign– ing of the treaty would be postponed as long as. Aerenthal continued by his vetoes to make it impossible to end the war. Aerenthal in his turn pointed out that the Italian Government could not 443 BibliotecaGino Bianco