Gaetano Salvemini - La politica estera italiana dal 1871 al 1915

Parte quarta expect a more cordial collaboration from the Centrai Powers as long as it in– dulged in "extravalses" with the Triple Entente. It should abandon "its see– saw policy between the Triple Alliance and the Powers of the Entente." It would do well to give proof "not only in words" of its desire "to reap still further advantages from the Triple Alliance." "The more clearly and cohe– rently Italy expresses this desire, the more intimate and cordial will be our relations with her" (December 19th). In other words, if the Italian Govern– ment wanted the Centrai Powers to pass from neutrality to cordiality in the Libyan question, it must not confine itself to renewing the alliance in the form which it had assumed between 1902 and 1909 but should moderate its friendship with the Entente Powers. Giolitti and San Giuliano had always considered the Triple Alliance as the cornerstone of Italian foreign policy. Moreover, they needed to get themselves out of the ditch into which they had thrown themselves by the decree of November 5th, i.e. they had to induce the Ottoman Government to accept Italian sovereignty over Libya. If the diplomacy of the Centrai Powers helped them in their hour of trouble, it was natural that they should do something to repay so signal a service. It would appear that there was never a frank exchange of ideas as to what the one side asked and what the other was prepared to give. But there was a change of attitude on the part of Giolitti and San Giuliano which could and did lead the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to believe that if they showed greater consideration of Italian needs, the Triple Alliance would be tightened and the "extravalses" would come to an end. 4. The tightening of the Triple Allt'ance On January 16th, 1912, an ltalian destroyer stopped the French mail– boat Carthage, en route from Marseilles to Tunis. It was carrying an airplane. The Italians suspected that the piane would pass from Tunis into Libya where it would be used by the Turks for military purposes. The captured ship was taken to the Italian port of Cagliari (Sardinia). The discussion be– tween Paris and Rome concerning the legality of this capture was still on foot when another French boat - the Manouba - was captured on January 18th, and taken to Cagliari. It was carrying from Marseilles to Tunis 29 Turks professing to be doctors and nurses of the Red Crescent (Ottoman Red Cross) who intended to pass from Tunisia into Libya. The Italian suspected them of being officers of the Turkish fighting forces, disguised. The Hague Court in May 1913 ruled that the Italian naval authorities had no right to capture the two ships. But even if in January 1912, the Italians could believe that they were acting within their rights, the French had grounds to suspect that by capturing the two ships the Italian government was wanting to make itself disagreable. There were many other and less spectacular 444 Biblioteca Gino Bianco