Gaetano Salvemini - La politica estera italiana dal 1871 al 1915

Parte quarta French remonstrances, not to mention those of the Central Powers. The Great Powers had given Rome a free hand in Libya and not against their own subjects in Syria. In these circumstances, the Turks could afford to sit tight and refuse peace for ever more - unless serious complications arose on the Balkan peninsula. But San Giuliano did not wish to stir up this hornet's nest. While the Italian forces were kept busy with Libya, the Rome Government would bave been in a position adeqately to resist Austrian attempts at expansion towards the Balkans. It was suspected in Rome that Aerénthal might take advantage of the Italo-Turkish war to occupy either Novi Bazar or Alba– nia. Therefore no one feared Balkan complications at that moment more than San Giuliano and Giolitti, and San Giuliano warmly advised all Balkan governments to be calm and prudent and r~spect the statu quo. Giolitti, in his Memoirs, compares the war waged with so·many shackles by Italy against Turkey to a "dance on eggs." 3. Triple Alliance and "extJ"avalses" Unable to attack the Ottoman Empire either in Albania or in the Aegean Sea or in Syria, and wishing to avoid a crisis in the Balkan peninsula, San Giuliano could hope for an end of his "dance on eggs" only if the govern– ments of the Triple Alliance or those of the Central Powers, or all together, should intervene energetically at Constantinople to induce the leaders of the Young Turks to accept the Italian demands. Unfortunately for him, at the moment he believed victory imminent, he had declared his acceptance of German mediation. The London and Paris Cabinets did not wish to play the German game by falling in behind Ger– many in promoting peace. They therefore adopted an attitude of neutrality, tempered by vague protestations of friendship for the Italians and sympathy for the Turks. They remained on the fence waiting for the Italo-Turkish quarrel to ruin German influence in Italy or in Turkey or in both coun– tries. The Government of St. Petersburg was willing to help the Italians out. They thought that while Italy was realizing her "aspirations" in Libya, Rus– sia might be able to realize hers in the Straits. The Young Turks, their hands tied by the war with Italy, and threatened with another war on the Balkan peninsula, would grant the Russian naval forces the monopoly of free passage through the Straits both in peace and war times. In return, besides other minor advantages, Russia offered Turkey her support in case of an attack on the Straits and adjoining territories, and her "good offices" in inducing the Balkan States to remain at peace. The Russian expected the Cabinets of Paris and London - the former an ally, and the latter a friend - to second their initiative. The "benevolence" of the Italians was forthcoming under 442 BibliotecaGino Bianco