Gaetano Salvemini - La politica estera italiana dal 1871 al 1915

The ltalo-Turkish War b rd of the country, and along the land frontiers of Egypt and Tunisia, :~d 0 :either the French nor the English local authorities displayed any ea– gerness in checking contraband traffic. Military operations never amounted to more than unimportant local kirmishes. In the year from October 1911 to October 1912, when the Italo– Turkish peace treaty was signed, the Italians had in all 1432 dead and 4250 wounded (during the World War they had on an average of 170.000 dead each year). The T~ 1 rks and the natives did not succeed i~ "throwing the Jtalians into the sea but they gave them no truce and practically kept them besieged in the coastal positions where they had landed. By October 1912 the Italians controlled the oasis east of Tripoli, as far as Tagiura about 12 miles from Tripoli; the oasis of Ain-Zara, about seven miles southeast of Tripoli; and to the west of Tripoli, toward Tunisia, still near the coast, the oases of Zanzur, Gargares, and Zuara. To the east of Homs, still along the seaboard, they controlled Misurata, and Ledba to the west. In Cyrenaica, they had won a certain freedom of movement around the positions occupied at the be– ginning of the war, but they had not gone beyond there. In all, they occu– pied two or three hundred square miles in a territory comprising from four to fìve hundred thousand square miles. The vital centers of the Ottoman Empire were not in the remote, poverty– stricken province of Libya which no one in Constantinople had given much thought to before the Italians took it into their heads to seize ìt. To force the Turks to make peace, the Italians would have te attack them in the Balkan peninsula or in the Aegean Sea. But in the Balkan peninsula Albania was protected by the Austro-Italian agreement of 1897. As far as Ottoman Aegean coasts and Aegean islands were concerned, they also were covered by articles VI and VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance which pledged all three allied governments to use their inBuence to prevent in the Aegean sea "any territorial modifìcation on the Ottoman coasts and islands." No sooner had San Giuliano indicated his wish that the Italian Beet should occupy islands of the Aegean or blockade the ports of Salonika, Cavalla or Smyrna, or the entrance to the Dardanelles, than Aehrenthal vetoed these operations as being contrary to the treaty of alliance (November 6th). On the other hand, by stating that they would accept the German ?overnment as mediator in their dispute with Turkey, Giolitti and San Giu– liano had roused the suspicion of the English and French diplomats. Thus they also "discreetly" intimated that they would not favor operations in the Aegean Sea. The coasts of Syria and those of Arabia on the Red Sea were not pro– tected ~~ the treaty of the Triple Alliance. But Arabia was as remote as Libya a~? mihtary operations in that sector could yield but meager results. The cities of Syria could be blockaded or even bombarded, but these cities had sub t · 1E s antia uropean colonies. A blockade or bombardment would have had no serious military consequences but would have provoked English and 441 Biblioteca Gino Bianco