Gaetano Salvemini - La politica estera italiana dal 1871 al 1915

The ltalo-Turkish War In the negotiations with France and England certain rights had been attributed to us recognition of which had been obtained from the other Great Powers, also. The m~ment had to come when we should be faced with the alternative: either to exercise these rights without hesitation or to renounce them. To go on possessing clains to Libya which prevented others from going there, without going there ourselves, would have been ridiculous. The international situation seemed favorable. Europe was divided into two camps: the Powers of the Triple Entente and the two Central Powers. Unless the Triple Entente attacked the Centrai Powers, and thus forced the Italians to intervene on the side of the latter, Italy was in a position of neutrality between the two blocks. Any government which assumed a hostile attitude towards Italian action in Libya at that moment would have broken not only the pledged given by it in the preceding years but would have also irritateci the Italian Government and spurred it to associate itself more closely with the rival diplomatic constellation. The Italian Government could refuse to renew the defensive alliance with the Central Powers and pass into the camp of the Triple Entente, or it could consent to make of the Triple Al– liance an instrument of aggression against the Entente Powers. To be sure there were the Young Turks who had seized power in the Ottoman Empire by the military pronunciamento of 1908 and were not pre– pared to stand passively by while the Italians amputateci Libya from Turkey. But the Italian military chiefs were certain that the occupation of Libya would not encounter serious obstacles. Moreover, the influence of German diplomacy was predominant in Constantinople. It was hoped that the Young Turks could be persuaded by the Germans to give up Libya once it had been occupied by Italian forces. This mediatory activity between Italy and Turkey on the part of the German Government was, as far as Italy was concerned, a positive advantage which went beyond the mere promise of "non-opposition" given in 1902. It had to be rewarded by some equivalent positive advantage. Giolitti and San Giuliano meditateci offering Germany the immediate renewal of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, though three years had still to elapse before the question of renewal would fall due. The offer, Giolitti explains, would have served "to bring home to Vienna and Berlin the realization that a hostile or lukewarm attitude towards us on their part would endanger the alliance." Once agreement had been reached on this point, German me– diation would have to· be carried out at the opportune moment before some partner of the Triple Entente had the chance to snatch for himself the credit for successful mediation. By thus enabling both Italy and Turkey to avoid the damages of a long-draw-out war, German diplomacy would strengthen hoth the Triple Alliance in Italy and German ascendancy in Turkey. 439 BibliotecaGino Bianco