Gaetano Salvemini - La politica estera italiana dal 1871 al 1915

Parte quarta would have been "suffocated" no one could explain. Metaphora are too apt to supplant ideas when emotions have supplanted reason. Between 1902 and 1909, the governments of ali the Great European Powers recognized that the Italian Government had the right of preemption over Liba. On March 9th, 1902, the German Government stated that it would leave the hands of the Italian Government "entirely free" towards Libya. Two days later the British ambassador to Rome issued a written state– ment to the effect that if at any time an alteration of the statu quo should take piace on the coasts of the Mediterranean, it would be the object of the British Government that "such alteration should be in conformity with Italian interests." On June 30th, 1902, when the treaty of the Triple Alliance was renewed, the Austro-Hungarian Government pledged itself not to interfere with the action of Italy in Libya, should the statu quo in North Africa undergo "any change whatsoever." On July 10th, 1902, the French Govern– ment gave the Italian Government its sanction "to develop freely its sphere of influence" ii:{Libya. Finally, on October 24th, 1902, the Russian Government pledged itself to "consider with benevolence" Italian interests in Libya. None of these concessions was obtained by Italian diplomats as a free gift. The British Government made its promise "on the understanding and in full confidence" that the Italian Government on its part had not entered and would not enter into arrangements with other powers "of a nature inimica! to British interests" in the Mediterranean. Towards the Berlin and Vienna Cabinets the Italian Government was pledged by the treaty of the Triple Alliance to military intervention on their side if they should be at– tacked, and to benevolent neutrality in ihe event of their taking the initia– tive in a war to guarantee their security. Towards the French Government the Italian Government was pledged not only to leave it a free hand in Morocco but also to refuse consent to any alteration in the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, hence to remain neutral in any war in which France should be attacked. In the understanding with the Russiàn Government the Italian Government had pladged itself to "consider with benevolence" Russian interests in the question of _the Straits. Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburg Cabinets had allowed the Italian Government to do what it liked, whereas the London and Vienna Cabinets had made the "free hand" contingent upon the eventuality of the statu quo breaking down as a consequence of the initiative of another power. In the Summer of 1911, the Franco-German dispute over Morocco carne to a head. The statu quo was going to be altered in one way or another. This was the moment for Italian diplomacy to step in and take possession of its herìtage. On July 1st, 1911, when Jagow, the German ambassador to Roma, announced to the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, that the German Government had sent the Panther to Agadir, San Giuliano commented: "The hour of Libya draws near for Italy." Giolitti, the Prime Minister of Italy in 1911, wrote in his memoirs: · 438 BibliotecaGino Bianco