Piao that the Party «grows out o! the barre! o! a gun.» Thé poor peasants o! the Azalea Mountain were oppressed by the Iandlords and evi! gentry unti! they carne to an impasse and under the leadership o! Lei Kang, they spontaneously took 'up arms to stage an insurrection. However, the bloody Iesson o! «rising and falling three times» enabled them to learn that although the sel!-defense army had risen up to make revolution under the powerful impact of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, because it had not the direct leadership of the Party, it became «a flock of wild geese without a leader.» Later, because Chingkangshan sent over a representative !rom the Party, the self-defense army was able to find the «guiding light», «score one victory after another and became ever more flourishing» under the leadership o! the Party. The vivid contrast between the former and the latter showed that without Party leadership, the peasants' armed forces would «fai! every time and end in disaster» and would repeat the many past tragic !ailures o! peasants' upris• ings. With the correct leadership of the Party «the self-defense army was put on the right course, and its future became bright and promistng.» This most eloquently tells people that only when there is Party leadership could there be a people's army. Only under the leadership of the politica! party o!· the proletariat and by advancing along the correct road of the Party could the army develop and grow and score victories in the revolutionary struggle. The history of the Chinese revolution has clearly shown that it is · the Party that created the army, and the Party definitely did not grow out of the ba_rrel of a gun. At the 6th plenum of the 6th CCP Centrai Committee in 1938, Chairman Mao pointed out: «Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must not be allowed to command the Party. Yet having guns, we. can create Party organizations, as witness the powerfuJ Party organizations which the Eighth, Routé Army has created in northem China.» («Problems of War and Strategy»). This brilliant assertion that «yet having guns, we can create Party organizations» was set forth by Chairman ~ao to oppose and criticize the wrong tendency of the Right-opportunist line within the Party on problems of war and strategy. This wa& m~de under. the premise of «our principle is that the Party commands. the gun, and the gun must not be allowe~ to command t,he P.3;~W».corr~ctly Iaid down beforehand by ChaiTT,l'lanMao. It e_mph~sized the role and imp<:>rtanceof the gun and pointed out that_ the army led by our Party not only could fight battles to annihilate the enemy, ··but also could make propaganda among the masses: &rganize the masses and help them set up politica! power, and even Communist ·Party organizations. The strong emphasis placed iby° the ·teacher of proletarian revolution on the extreme importance of the gun precisely shows that it is most important for the politica! party of the proletariat to exercise absolute leadership over the army and directly command. the .gun. .The words, «yet having guns, we lU'
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